Rwanda’s image abroad: how western countries are beginning to turn their backs

Rwanda enjoyed good relations with the western world for many years. This was due to systematic and intentional efforts to build its profile as a constructive regional actor, especially through the UN peacekeeping framework.

It also set out to improve its national brand through sports sponsorships of some of the biggest football clubs in the world. These include Arsenal (England), PSG (France) and Bayern Munich (Germany).

Since the end of the 1994 genocide, countries such as the UK, the US and France were willing to give Rwanda a less than critical pass when it was accused of destabilising its bigger neighbour, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 

They averted their gaze from its domestic heavy handedness, particularly its constraining of democratic space and human rights.

But there has been a sharp turn in sentiment. For the first time, the western powers, as well as China, have begun to call out Rwanda on its behaviour.

Western actors have grown exasperated with Rwanda’s impunity and have been forced to change tack. 

Quiet shuttle diplomacy, notably by the Biden administration and the EU, has failed to achieve Rwandan restraint. And as a humanitarian crisis grew, they saw more forceful and overt actions as necessary.

Concerned about the rising level of violence and humanitarian catastrophe in the DRC, western powers through the UN general assembly and security council called for restraint, dialogue and de-escalation. 

France, Belgium, Germany, the US, Canada and the EU also condemned the escalating violence and Rwanda’s role. The growing consensus culminated in firmer and direct sanctions against individual Rwandan actors and entities and suspension of economic and trade cooperation.

I have been a long time scholar of and commentator on African regime types, political governance and conflict, with a focus on Rwanda. 

It’s my view that Rwanda’s escapades in eastern DRC have had a detrimental impact on the goodwill long extended to the Kigali regime. What happens next will depend on its response.

Rwanda’s role in the DRC

There is little doubt about Rwanda’s involvement in conflict and instability in the eastern DRC. The reports from the security council and UN bodies have provided sufficient evidence of this.

Since 2012, Rwanda has been accused of being the patron behind the Movement of March 23 (M23) rebel group. The M23 and its associated alliances have been fighting the DRC government, purportedly to protect the rights of Congolese Tutsis.

For its part, Rwanda has pointed to the danger posed by remnants of security forces involved in the 1994 genocide. The forces fled into the DRC and are still hell bent on causing instability in Rwanda, Kigali claims. The other grievance is that the forces are backed by the DRC regime and have been responsible for persecuting Congolese Tutsis.

Between 2012 and 2018, the M23 group had a limited level of military success. In 2012 it captured the eastern DRC city of Goma but was forced to relinquish it after just 10 days.

In the latest escalation of fighting the group has made significant gains, recapturing Goma and capturing the bigger Bukavu and other areas.

M23’s success has been attributed to the sustained and systematic support Rwanda has given the group, according to the UN report and security council resolution 2773.

Support has included sophisticated weaponry and boots on the ground, conservatively estimated at over 4,000 soldiers. Faced with demotivated, ill-trained and poorly coordinated DRC military capabilities, the M23 success was almost inevitable.

The turnaround

In August 2023 and again on 20 February 2025, the US slapped sanctions on key players in Rwanda and the M23 Alliance. The EU and the UK then paused some economic support for Rwanda. This was a strategic signal from the big powers.

Germany then froze aid, Belgium’s rebuked the country and the EU called for stronger penalties, among them a ban on Rwanda’s mineral industry. This was to force Rwanda to rein in or rethink its activities in the DRC and be a constructive rather than disruptive partner.

Belgium has had historical relations with both Rwanda and the DRC, having been the last colonial authority. Rwanda took specific exception to Belgium’s action by cutting diplomatic relations. It also took a more belligerent posture in the UN security council.

While this is seen as a non-compromising stance, it is against a lesser western power than the US or the UK. This could be taken as Rwanda saving face while working out an exit strategy to avoid escalating tensions with western powers or provoking far reaching coordinated action.

It is notable that Qatar (and not a western or African power) has taken a lead in chaperoning talks between the conflict parties. This couldn’t have been without the blessing of the US, given the close relationship Qatar enjoys with the US as conflict resolution partners. Qatar is also an investor in Rwanda. This allows Rwanda to avoid being dragged to the negotiating table by critical western powers.

Next steps

The intensity of the conflict has slowed down somewhat, with the M23 rebel alliance having announced a ceasefire and unilateral action to “withdraw” from some of the areas they have recently captured.

Whether this is a strategic compromise in response to the now forceful demand for Rwanda to cease its active support and intervention is unclear. It is notable that Qatar has now directly invited the rebels to the table.

Once known as the darling of the west, most notable for clean and efficient government, a good business environment and unquestioned security and stability, Rwanda may have reached an inflection point with its flagrant DRC intervention. The change in western attitude may mark a more critical epoch in relations.

David E Kiwuwa is the Associate Professor of International Studies at University of Nottingham.