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Zanzibar crisis: Economic, political impact versus future of Tanzania

Zanzibar President Dr Ali Mohamed Shein shakes hands with Opposition CUF secretary general Seif Sharif Hamad at an event to celebrate the Birth of Prophet Mohammed (S.A.W) at Maisara Suleiman in Unguja Zanzibar. PHOTO | FILE

What you need to know:

The aid, which doesn’t have to be serviced, was to boost the country’s electrification project.

Dar es Salaam. Every action has its price. The nullification of Zanzibar elections has already cost Tanzania. The young economy was just denied the $472.8 million (Sh1 trillion) Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grant from the US.

The aid, which doesn’t have to be serviced, was to boost the country’s electrification project.

Democratically, the crisis has been described as a spot in the otherwise positive Tanzanian democratic growth. By punishing the whole of Tanzania for mistakes of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission, the US implies that not only does the Union government possess powers to directly influence events in Zanzibar but it also has the duty and responsibility to “police” its entire territory, Zanzibar included, and ensuring all goes well. This thinking prevails among most members of the international community. It has been reinforced by the fact that it is the same ruling party, CCM, which holds sway in both the Union and Zanzibar governments. It explains the existing pressure on President John Magufuli to solve the crisis.

But, traditionally and constitutionally the Union government has always been helpless in influencing events in Zanzibar and, specifically, as far as the democratic process and local politics were concerned. Ironically the international community has always looked in dismay, since the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar 52 years ago, at why the Union government has failed to stamp its authority in rectifying major domestic crises in the Isles.

The Union government’s lack of influence over Zanzibar’s internal affairs could be best explained both by the context in which the Union was achieved and by the very unique nature of the Union.

Zanzibar revolution and unification with Tanganyika

The unification between Tanganyika and Zanzibar on April 26, 1964 was achieved immediately after the Zanzibar revolution of January 12, 1964.

Historians say the revolution was hastily carried out and there was confusion as to whether the major political actors - Abeid Amani Karume and Abdulraham Mohammed Babu- were directly involved. The confusion was further aggravated by the fact that both Karume and Babu were in Dar es Salaam when the Sultan’s regime fell.

The revolution itself seemed as poorly coordinated and continued haphazardly. There was chaos, and when the Sultan finally fled, killings and looting continued unabated.

In fact there were reports that the ASP-backed revolution was to happen later in that year and that the ASP leadership might have been somehow taken by surprise by the January 12 one, writes William Edgett Smith in his book Nyerere of Tanzania: The First Decade 1961-1971.

“Many observers in East Africa believe that the Afro-Shirazis, probably with the support of the Umma party and perhaps with unofficial Tanganyika backing, were preparing to launch a coup a few weeks later [after the January revolution],” Smith writes in his book. But it was the events after the revolution that determine the nature of the Union, which was, itself, hurriedly formulated and concluded. As the revolution was unravelling there was confusion as to who was in charge. John Okello, who was the mastermind of the revolution kept making Radio announcements and calling back Karume to take over the country. But in some other announcements, usually done during the night, he was implying that he was in fact in-charge and Karume was his deputy, Smith writes.

Leadership vacuum

The confusion led to fears of a possible counter-coup from the Sultan who was still hanging around in the Zanzibar channel waters in his Yacht.

The leadership vacuum that ensued led to killings and looting, especially, in the rural areas. Karume, seemingly unable to keep things under control and fearing a possible counter-coup had to ask for a contingent of 300 policemen from Tanganyika to help keep law and order.

But it was the Cold War pitying the West (US, Western Europe and their allies) against the East communist countries (Russia, China and their allies) that posed the largest challenge.

The new Karume-led government was desperate for legitimacy and he therefore sought recognition from world powers mainly the US and the UK. However hard he tried and despite the US having clear interests in the Isles in terms of the Satellite Tracking Station, Western powers refused to recognise the new government. The Communist countries, on the other hand, jumped at the opportunity and not only recognized the new government but some of them [East Germany] opened full-fledged embassies, and others [China, Russia] started dishing out financial and military aid and sending technicians, doctors and army consultants to Zanzibar. In fact the veritable Chinese inroads to Tanzania started through Zanzibar after the revolution. This, coupled, with the forced closure of the American embassy and Satellite Tracking station made Zanzibar a perfect cold-war battle field.

Karume’s anxiety that the West cold collude with the Sultan or some other elements for a counter-coup and the sense of failure that domestic upheavals could go out of hand in the Isles might have pushed him towards the union. In fact in a book entitled Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? Lessons of Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union Prof Issa Shivji details how Americans, out of fear that Zanzibar could become the “Cuba of Africa”, had thought of possibilities of removing the new government. Being politically unsophisticated and largely uneducated President Karume depended on the advice of other main players such as Babu. Not only did these push Karume towards the communist sphere of influence, they were also against the Union, or at least against the immediate unification with Tanganyika, observers say.

In the articles of the Union, later cemented within the constitution the Union government’s powers in Zanzibar were only in those issues deemed “union matters.” These include, but not limited to, currency, foreign trade, foreign affairs, defence, immigration, citizenship, customs, police, civil aviation, posts and telecommunications.

The Articles of the Union did not touch things like Zanzibar domestic politics, human rights, democratization and others. Pius Msekwa, a veteran politician and former Speaker of the National Assembly who witnessed the Union while working as a senior official says the extensive autonomy of Zanzibar within the Union [in its domestic affairs] was so intended by the founding fathers President Julius Nyerere of the Republic of Tanganyika, and President Karume of the Peoples’ Republic of Zanzibar and was deliberately created by them in the Articles of Union.

“The fact that the two-government structure was a unique and unusual form of Union between two countries was fully acknowledged by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who set out to explain, in great detail, the reason why he and President Karume chose this particular Union structure,” Mr Msekwa says.

Mr Msekwa notes that Nyerere said the options that were available for the union; of one government within a unitary state or a federation of three governments were rejected because of the small size of Zanzibar. “Nyerere said a unitary state could have given the impression that the Mainland was swallowing Zanzibar,” Mr Msekwa says. And so they opted for a union structure that would preserve the uniqueness of Zanzibar.

Karume intentions

The Union and the limited integration with Tanganyika might have been shaped by Karume’s intentions for the unification project. Having been “forced” to unite by circumstances he might have decided that he will use the Union for his own political reasons - for the Union government to help in putting down dissent or possible overthrow dissidents both foreign and domestic. But he certainly would not agree to or want any direct influence or interference from the Mainland on things Zanzibar domestic affairs.

Observers point out that foreigners were surprised, upon arrival in Zanzibar a few months after the revolution, to see that Zanzibar went on with life as if the Union had not taken place. No integration seemed to be taking place.

Direct contacts with foreign, especially communist, governments continued and Karume still refused to disclose dealings in foreign trade. Travellers from Dar es Salaam still needed special visas to go to Zanzibar and Tanganyika officials were, at times refused entry in Zanzibar, according to Smith.

The integration that foreigners and even Tanganyikans had hoped would happen never did. Many wondered why former Tanzania President Julius Nyerere could not push for more assimilation of Zanzibar into the Union.

Because of the unique two-government structure of the Union, Mr Msekwa says, the Union President was expressly excluded from exercising any power or authority over all non-Union matters relating to Zanzibar. “The matter of elections of Zanzibar leaders is a non-Union matter,” Mr Msekwa says.

Eight years after the Union, at the time of Karume’s death, Zanzibar was still ruled under decree. No elections had been conducted. There had been no independent judiciary or legislature. The only democratic rights that Zanzibaris had were the Union presidential elections. Zanzibar only had first local elections in 1980 when the House of Representatives was established and the first presidential elections took place in 1985.

Smith says in his book that once when asked when Zanzibar would hold elections Karume is reported to have said he didn’t expect elections in Zanzibar for 50 years. “Elections are a tool of imperialists to sabotage the people,” Karume is quoted as saying.

Zanzibar domestic issues

At that time, in the 1960s and 1970s, Tanzanian elections had become competitive. Political heavyweights were being defeated in parliamentary polls, despite the country being a one-party state. And the international community wondered why Nyerere or the union government could not influence or imbue similar democratic credentials to Zanzibar.

When asked about the Union government’s helplessness on Zanzibar domestic issues Nyerere is reported to have replied: “The Zanzibaris are a proud people. No one has ever intended that they should become simply the Republic’s 18th region.”

Apart from elections Nyerere could not stop human rights abuses that were going on after the revolution, like the execution of Karume’s enemies such as Kassim Hanga and forced marriages of Arab girls to African politicians. Parents or relatives who objected to these marriages were routinely jailed and it became a big embarrassment to the Union government.

Prof Benson Bana from the University of Dar es Salaam also says the current political impasse in Zanzibar is a product of electoral politics which are deep-rooted in Zanzibar’s political history and that the Union government’s role in resolving it could be limited.

“Since 1959, there has never been an occasion where a losing party in multiparty elections conceded defeat with honour save 2010 general election which ushered in a Government of National Unity (GNU) following the compromising wisdom of the two principals, the retired President Aman Abeid Karume and CUF’s Secretary General, Maalim Seif Sharif Hamad,” Prof Bana said adding “the then President of Tanzania, retired President Jakaya Kikwete, was not directly involved in the negotiations, leading to a GNU, between Zanzibar’s two major political actors. His influence may not have been significant and his role was somewhat peripheral.”

Prof Bana further says that despite the fact that leaders of the Union government, like many responsible Tanzanians, are seriously concerned over the state of politics in Zanzibar and much as they may be informally involved in search for the solutions their formal involvement must be guided by the legal arrangements and institutional frameworks within which they exercise their mandates.

Prof Bana says the resolve of the Union President Dr Magufuli in the solving the current crisis is to motivate, encourage and cajole the main parties to amicably resolve the conflict for peaceful coexistence, harmony, tranquillity and betterment of Zanzibar.

Strains in the Union

The unique nature of the Union means that there have been stresses and strains from the very beginning. Originally, these were caused by Zanzibar’s lack of democratic space and human rights violations. Later on, especially since the early 1980s, the cause of the tensions has been Zanzibar’s quest for more autonomy and even in some cases, a desire from secession.

While the Constitutional Review Commission proposed the adoption of a three government structure, the CCM-dominated Constituent Assembly (CA) settled for the continuation of the current system. This led to protests by the Opposition who, having formed the Ukawa coalition, walked out of the CA and boycotted the constitutional making process altogether.

Way forward

The status quo is no desirable, analysts say. Having a union in a way that the Union government does not have powers to positively influence events to avert disasters or crisis is dangerous for the whole country, they add.