Lipstick on a pig: Tazara’s SGR solution misses the point

Tanzania and Zambia have agreed to deploy resources to modernise and revitalise the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (Tazara). The announcement was made during Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema’s visit to Tanzania in August.

Tazara is to be upgraded to a standard gauge railway (SGR) to allow quicker speeds and more reliability.

The decision to fix Tazara is admirable, but without addressing the fundamental issues, the new network will be subject to the same harmful forces that have made Tazara what it is today.

When Zambia gained independence, it relied on the then white-ruled neighbours of Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa for port access. For a frontline state involved in the liberation struggles in southern Africa, that was untenable. As a result, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere conceived the north-eastern railway line to provide Zambia with access to Dar es Salaam Port.

Financing the construction of an 1,860km railway through challenging terrain was not child’s play. The British and Americans had ruled that out in the 1960s. However, the Chinese, led by Chairman Mao then, offered to bankroll the project. Tazara was a kick in the teeth for the West following an alliance of three leftist administrations despite Western objections.

The Chinese investment in Tazara, worth over $2 billion today, was and may still be the largest Chinese-funded project in Africa. The Chinese were not particularly wealthy then, so this was a substantial sum of money for them to part with. They did so, though, with good reason. The project improved their standing in Africa and gave China access to natural resources.

From Dar, Tazara runs via the coastal plains before emerging in the lush green fields of Kilombero and Ifakara. Beyond Ifakara is Mlimba, where a treacherous 156km stretch begins and concludes at Makambako. In this section, the railway line reaches an altitude of 2,500 metres, traversing through twisting peaks, steep gorges and deep marshlands. Tens of thousands of Chinese and African labourers braved the elements and nature to give Tazara a shot here. Following Makambako, the rail parallels the US-funded Tanzam highway. It then gradually eases towards Mbeya and Tunduma before entering Zambia via Nakonde and descending to Kapiri Mposhi, the gateway to the Copperbelt.

Despite questionable business logic, Tazara was a game-changing transport alternative when it began operations in 1976. Within two years, annual freight volumes had reached 1.1 million tonnes. However, when the Rhodesians destroyed the Chambeshi River bridge in Zambia in 1979, operations faltered. Multiple external initiatives were required to give Tazara a new lease on life, finally lifting cargo volumes to an all-time high of 1.9 million tonnes in 1991, but success was short-lived. Cargo volumes tumbled to a low of 130,000 tonnes in 2015, well short of Tazara’s 5 million-tonne capacity.

What happened to Tazara?

Tazara’s decline was due to many factors, including relatively weak Chinese locomotives, a lack of technical experience, the demise of white rule in southern African nations and the end of the copper boom in the mid-1990s. As a result, freight volumes from Zambia through Tazara plunged, putting the company in perpetual financial trouble. In 2009, the company was almost at a breaking point financially.

These factors, however, do not provide a clear picture of the situation. While the business case was doubtful in the 1970s, it is better today and Tazara should be doing better.

In 2014, for example, when Dar handled 1.8 million tonnes of goods bound for Zambia, Tazara transported less than 10 percent of the freight despite having an unrivalled cost advantage. In Morogoro, residents of the agricultural areas of Kilombero, Ifakara, and Mlimba have been heavily dependent on Tazara from the beginning for lack of solid alternatives. However, Tazara has struggled to capitalise on that opportunity. For example, when Ifakara welcomes hundreds of people daily nowadays in the town with over 200 guest houses, at least a dozen buses arrive from Dar alone every day. When Tazara journeys frequently take twice as long as expected due to technical faults and fuel shortages, and when toilets are dirty and lack basic amenities, even railroad enthusiasts will be pushed to competitors.

Addressing these issues, and increasing the efficiency of Dar es Salaam Port will make Tanzania a considerably more appealing option for Zambian firms. When ships waste up to two weeks for port access, this is a nightmare scenario for businesses. The alternative would create billions of dollars in extra revenue for Tanzania and boost freight volumes accessible to Tazara considerably.

Many of the causes that contributed to Tazara’s decline have less to do with money and more to do with governance and culture. SGR will not solve those problems. All it will do is perpetuate the practice of throwing money at problems rather than fixing them. Given the high cost of SGR, officials would be wise to fix current issues before embarking on a new project. From this vantage point, upgrading Tazara to SGR without doing that now is akin to putting lipstick on a pig.

It is time for Tanzania and Zambia to confront Tazara’s fundamental problems. Otherwise, while the SGR solution is novel, the old problems will continue unabated.