Niger: Is coup an African solution to an African problem?

Soldiers of the elite presidential guard in Niger, led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, declared that they had deposed the government of President Mohamed Bazoum. In a matter of days, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) gave a week to putschists to hand back power, threatening military action if that demand was not met.

The coup was a surprise. After all, Niger seemed to fare better in terms of insecurity compared to two neighbouring countries, Mali and Burkina Faso, which have experienced coups of their own in recent years. It was also a surprise that Niger’s coup leader, at 62, is an old man. In recent years, coups have been the business of relatively younger men.

Could the threat of violence against power grabs be Africa’s answer to ending the spectre of coups on the continent?

Coups, which have been described by some as "Africa’s newest problem", have haunted the continent since the dawn of political independence in the 1960s. However, the latest threat of military action against Niger putschists is not new to West Africa or even to some other parts of Africa.

Soldiers in West Africa have a peculiar relationship with democracy.

The majority of countries in West Africa have experienced military coups over the decades. With the advent of democracy, soldiers have played pivotal roles in restoring power to ousted leaders in West Africa. During the 1990s, as war ravaged Liberia and Sierra Leone and descended further into madness, Ecowas sent troops to both countries in different countries. The outcomes of these interventions were, relatively speaking, successful, in part because the governments in those countries besieged by rebels but controlling the airports and ports had requested the help of foreign troops.

In 2011, after disputed elections in Ivory Coast, Ecowas threatened to send troops to end the political impasse, but those plans failed to materialise; instead, Laurent Gbagbo was ousted by troops loyal to his successor, Alassane Ouattara, with the help of French troops and UN forces.

Ecowas again threatened military intervention in The Gambia to force then-defeated incumbent Yahya Jammeh to relinquish power to his elected successor.

In 2008, the African Union authorised a military intervention from Tanzania, Libya, Sudan, and Senegal in the Comoros on the breakaway island of Anjouan to crush a year-old rebellion led by Colonel Mohamad Bacar.

In all these scenarios, the recognised governments in power had requested military help or had the support of the majority of the population. Not a single one of these governments was fighting a rebel group that had swept any of them from power. Also, none of these countries was involved in a military coup under circumstances like those in Niger, where there are many forces at play, both at regional and global levels.

In all previous interventions on the continent, military interventions alone did not solve or end the underlying causes that had led to either civil war or incumbents usurping power after election defeats.

That required other protracted efforts to address the issues and the dynamics at play for sustainable solutions. Boots on the ground and more guns did not solve these issues.

In Niger, the putschists appear to be flirting with the possibility of gravitating towards Russia and the mercenary Warner Group, who are already heavily involved in other African countries facing similar security challenges. Once again, Africa seems to be caught in the web of global politics, in which its choices do not improve its lot.

Since the coup was announced, there appears to be some degree of support for the illegal takeover of power. However, the extent of this support is unclear because there are those who are pushing against the coup.

Niger appears to be caught between a rock and a hard place, and more guns may send the country deeper into the quagmire. Clearly, one of the parties to the ongoing crisis has miscalculated its chances of success.

The threat of military intervention will not deter soldiers from pursuing political power in Africa. After all, not all countries are members of any regional grouping on the continent, and some of these regional groupings are more effective than others and can mobilise easily to respond to various crises among member states.

Military intervention, while it may be a deterrent in some situations, is a temporary solution to the underlying causes driving soldiers out of their barracks.

The Sahel is headed for more political and security turbulence.