People gather on top of debris of buildings at the scene of an explosion near the Presidential Palace, also known as Villa Somalia, in the Hamar Jajab district of Mogadishu, Somalia March 18, 2025.
Kenya’s national security hawks are likely losing sleep. The months ahead threaten crises at its northern borders—familiar, yet now converging in a perfect storm.
A troubling piece appeared in Ethiopia’s Addis Standard on March 21: From Insurgency to Power Grab: Al-Shabaab’s Deadly Advance on Mogadishu Signals Somalia’s Descent into Disaster. Written by Horn of Africa analyst Adam Daud Ahmed, it painted an unsettling picture of al-Shabaab’s growing strength. No longer just an insurgency launching sporadic attacks, al-Shabaab is morphing into a “government-in-waiting” with a shot at capturing Mogadishu. It now operates within 30 kilometres of the capital—closer than in recent years.
The article argues that al-Shabaab’s ability to recapture vast territory in weeks shows not just military prowess but intent to govern. With the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia ending in December 2024, its replacement, the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia, struggles to hold ground. The Somali National Army, plagued by corruption and infighting, is no match for al-Shabaab’s disciplined fighters.
It warns that if trends continue, Mogadishu could fall by mid-2025. Without a drastic shift—via a unified government response, international intervention, or negotiations—the Somali state risks collapse.
Meanwhile, South Sudan teeters on the edge of civil war. Clashes and rivalries threaten to unravel a fragile peace before a key transitional deadline. The fault line remains the feud between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar. Warning signs are ominous. Clashes in Upper Nile State—including a March 8 attack on a UN helicopter that killed a crew member—signal a security breakdown. Forces loyal to Kiir have battled the opposition’s “White Army,” prompting Uganda to intervene.
Crumbling economy
Add a crumbling economy, 7.1 million facing hunger, and over 300,000 refugees from Sudan’s war. With America evacuating staff and the UN sounding alarms, South Sudan’s future looks bleak.
On a third front, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea threaten to reignite war, years after their joint campaign against Tigray rebels (2020–2021). Ethiopia’s push for Red Sea access, championed by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, has unnerved Eritrea, which sees it as a challenge to its sovereignty over ports like Assab. Since 2023, Abiy has framed sea access as “existential”, deepening Asmara’s suspicions. Eritrea’s exclusion from the 2022 Pretoria Agreement—ending the Tigray war but leaving Eritrean troops in Ethiopia—has soured relations. Asmara views the deal as strengthening the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), its old enemy, now aligned with Addis Ababa.
A power struggle within Tigray complicates matters. One faction, led by Debretsion Gebremichael and allegedly backed by Eritrea, is at odds with another under Getachew Reda, aligned with Addis Ababa. This rift has turned Tigray into a flashpoint. Eritrea’s reported support for dissident Tigrayan forces and Ethiopia’s military build-up near their border suggest mounting tensions. Eritrea’s pacts with Egypt and Somalia—counterweights to Ethiopia—add intrigue.
Closer to home, Ethiopia’s Amhara region is spiralling. Clashes between federal forces and the Fano militia—driven by grievances over marginalisation and the 2023 disbanding of regional forces—are intensifying. Abiy, stretched by conflicts in Tigray and Oromia, faces a precarious moment. With Amhara’s 30-million-strong population near Addis Ababa, a full-blown war could trigger a humanitarian disaster and ripple regionally.
Dangerous crossroads
Kenya could find itself standing at a dangerous crossroads. A renewed South Sudanese civil war, an al-Shabaab takeover in Somalia, and an Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict could upend its security, economy and regional influence.
War in South Sudan could push militias into Kenya’s northwest, echoing the 2013–2018 civil war when cross-border skirmishes and arms trafficking surged.
If al-Shabaab seizes Somalia, Kenya’s 700-kilometre border would become a frontline. The group’s past attacks could pale in comparison to what an emboldened al-Shabaab might attempt. The militants could also exploit Kenyan recruits, while a refugee exodus could strain local resources, sparking tensions. And there’s the small matter of the 2027 African Cup of Nations, which Kenya is co-hosting with Tanzania and Uganda.
On the economic front, Ethiopia and South Sudan are vital to Kenya’s $23 billion Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport corridor. Renewed conflict would cripple South Sudan’s oil exports and Ethiopia’s trade through Lamu, slashing Kenya’s revenue. Meanwhile, an al-Shabaab-controlled Somalia could disrupt port trade. Tourism—only recently recovered —could take another hit.
A distracted Ethiopia, embroiled in war with Eritrea, would weaken regional counterterrorism efforts against al-Shabaab, forcing Kenya to shoulder more of the burden. In the past, Nairobi would lean on its Western allies, particularly the US. But with an isolationist Donald Trump in the White House, the Americans may not be home when Kenya calls.
The author is a journalist, writer, and curator of the “Wall of Great Africans”. @cobbo3.
