A last-minute plea: Dr Salim’s attempt to avert the Gulf War
Former Tanzanian diplomat and Prime Minister Dr Salim Ahmed Salim
What you need to know:
- Iraqi forces had occupied Kuwait for months, tensions were high, and military action by the coalition forces led by the United States seemed inevitable against Baghdad.
The year was 1991, and the world stood on the precipice of war.
Iraqi forces had occupied Kuwait for months, tensions were high, and military action by the coalition forces led by the United States seemed inevitable against Baghdad.
Yet, amidst the escalating conflict, a quiet effort for peace was unfolding. At the centre of it stood Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU), latest documents published in the diplomat’s archives on Thursday, April 18, 2024, titled Salim’s Personal Notes reveal.
Salim's journey took him to Cairo, Egypt, where he met with President Hosni Mubarak. His mission was to try to avert the impending invasion of Iraq by US-led coalition forces. The atmosphere was equally tense.
Accompanied by a certain unnamed protocol officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Major Zongo, Salim arrived at the Presidential Palace at Heliopolis almost an hour before his appointment with President Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak.
In the 50 minutes that followed, he engaged with Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr Boutros Boutros Ghali, on a number of issues.
“We had a 50-minute discussion that was both extensive and substantive, ranging from the Gulf crisis to the situation in South Africa, where I voiced my grave concern about the erosion of the African and international consensus on sanctions,” reads the notes.
President Mubarak was deeply angered by Saddam Hussein's deceitful actions. Not only did Hussein deceive him when he went to Baghdad on the eve of Iraq's invasion, but he also distorted the substance of their private discussions.
“As to be expected under the circumstances, a greater part of our discussion was devoted to the Gulf crisis. And the President spoke with his characteristic candour and openness. In the process, he remarked that he was not a diplomat, and he thus was prepared to call a spade a spade,” writes Dr Salim.
President Mubarak told Dr Salim that the Iraqi President wrongly alleged that in their talks (the Mubarak/Saddam talks), the aides of the two presidents were present. But this was utterly false. The meeting took place between the two of them alone.
Mubarak said he believed Saddam was delusional about the overwhelming force arrayed against him and their determination to evict him from Kuwait.
According to Dr Salim, Mubarak was exceedingly contemptuous and dismissive of Iraq's military capacity and threat against the allied forces.
“When I asked him about peaceful efforts, he catalogued the efforts he personally had made to persuade Saddam, but in vain. There have been correspondences between the two leaders, and intermediaries have been used.”
And because of his lack of commitment, his last letter to Saddam Hussein sent on December 30, which was 40 pages long, remained unanswered.
“It was clear that President Mubarak is very embittered by Saddam. It was also clear that he was very pessimistic on the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the Gulf crisis and putting all the blame on Saddam Hussein,” writes the diplomat.
Despite the pessimism, Salim didn't give up. He saw a potential role for Africa. He reminded President Mubarak of the recent initiative by several African leaders in the Liberian conflict. Could a similar approach work here?
Mubarak warmed to the idea. He suggested that the then-current OAU Chairman, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, send a letter urging Saddam's withdrawal.
Mubarak even proposed a collective effort, with several African leaders sending a unified message for peace.
"Later, President Mubarak echoed the proposal of his Minister of State, Dr Boutros Ghali, that several African Heads of State could write to President Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.”
Salim saw a flicker of hope. He skillfully steered the conversation away from the Gulf, discussing pressing African issues like the conflicts in Sudan and Somalia. This shift offered a temporary respite from the immediate crisis.
Though the historical record doesn't tell us the exact outcome, Salim's efforts, though ultimately unsuccessful, offer a glimpse into a different narrative—one where Africa, through quiet diplomacy, attempted to avert the Gulf War.
His meeting with President Mubarak offers a glimpse into the backroom diplomacy and the desperate search for peace in those critical weeks before the war began.
