Dodoma. They say knowing the law is bliss, and that was precisely the case for former police officer Said Hashim in Mara region after the High Court ordered his reinstatement following his dismissal over alleged messages sent to a WhatsApp group.
In a judgment delivered on Monday, August 3, 2026, High Court Judge Angelo Rumisha of the Dodoma Main Registry ordered Inspector General of Police (IGP) Camillus Wambura to reinstate the officer immediately and pay all salaries, allowances, and entitlements missed since his dismissal.
Besides ordering his reinstatement to duty, the court quashed the decision to dismiss him alongside the appellate ruling which had upheld the punishment.
A copy of the judgment was uploaded onto the TanzLII website on Tuesday, August 4, 2026.
Mr Hashim had filed an application for judicial review naming the Mara Regional Police Commander (RPC), the IGP, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Attorney General (AG) as respondents, challenging his dismissal from the Police Force.
The constable, who served in Musoma District within Mara Region, was alleged to have posted a message in a WhatsApp group named DP 2003 Forum Members, reading: ‘Duhhh they are just looting, Samia, your money is being eaten, inspection readiness across all regions.’
He was alleged to have committed the offence on May 31, 2023, contrary to good order of the Police Force, a charge he denied after disciplinary proceedings were instituted against him.
The Police Force claimed that the act violated the Code of Conduct for the Tanzania Police Force.
However, it later emerged that the cited section did not exist, and furthermore, the words contained in the message did not constitute any legal offence on the face of it.
According to the application documents, the officer, represented in court by advocate Charles Simon, contested his dismissal by raising nine grounds.
However, the court decided to deal solely with the third ground of the petition.
In that ground, the officer claimed that he was charged with an offence unknown under the Police Service Regulations.
Submissions by advocates
Presenting his arguments, advocate Simon stated that his client was charged with an offence unknown in law, meaning even the decision to dismiss him was void.
He argued that the charge of misconduct, which relied on Regulation C.5 (XLVII) of the Police Service Regulations of 1995 alongside paragraph 47 of Appendix ‘A’ of Police General Orders (PGO) 106, cited non-existent provisions.
He explained that the Police Service Regulations of 1995 end at Regulation C.5 (XLVI), meaning Regulation C.5 (XLVII) does not exist as cited in both counts.
Furthermore, he noted that paragraph 47 of Appendix ‘A’ of PGO 106 is equally unrecognised.
On that basis, he submitted that the applicant was prosecuted under legally defective charges, rendering the dismissal decision null and void from the outset.
Responding to the submissions, advocate Yohana Marco, representing all four respondents, opposed the application, stating the disciplinary charge was drafted using Form PF.32A prescribed under police procedures.
He explained that the responsibility of the Senior Supervising Officer was to approve the charge under paragraph 13 of the form, as required by Police General Orders (PGO) 106(35).
Regarding the ground of non-existence of the offence, he argued that the offence charged was provided for under Regulation C.5 (XLVI) of the Police Service Regulations of 1995.
He contended that the applicant’s grievance stemmed from a minor typographical error in citing the relevant provision.
"Such a clerical error cannot transform a legally recognised disciplinary offence into an unknown offence nor create a different offence," he argued.
He insisted that the error could have been amended pursuant to Regulation C.12 (6) of the Police Service Regulations of 1995.
Judge's ruling
In his ruling, Judge Rumisha stated he thoroughly examined the Police Service Regulations of 1995 together with the Police General Orders (PGO) and agreed with the applicant’s advocate that Regulation C.5 (XLVII) does not exist.
The Judge noted that neither Police General Order 106A (37) creates the offence charged against the applicant nor that the regulations end at Regulation C.5 (XLVI).
Similarly, he stated the offences listed in Appendix ‘A’ of PGO 106 do not include paragraph 46, making the matter undisputed.
"The matter is undisputed. However, the core question is not whether an error exists. Clearly it does. The true controversy lies in the legal consequences of that error," observed Judge Rumisha.
He added that the applicant answered the charge and fully participated in proceedings by cross-examining prosecution witnesses and subsequently delivering his defence.
"Indeed, he openly admitted sending the complained WhatsApp message. However, records show he maintained throughout that the message mentioned no specific person and was merely a follow-up comment on an earlier document shared within the group."
The Judge remarked that, in that context, misciting Regulation C.5(XLVII) or PGO 106A(37) did not prevent the applicant from understanding the charge he faced.
However, he noted that this does not resolve the issue but raises the critical question of whether the applicant was charged with and dismissed for a legally recognised offence.
"If the misconduct stems from the message contents themselves, the charge failed to specify which element of those words constituted misconduct. It mentions neither the violated rule, the breached standard of conduct, nor how the message impaired police discipline."
The Judge also noted it was surprising that the message named no individual, nor linked any recognizable person to allegations of theft, corruption, or other criminal conduct.
"It was written in general terms. Thus, one is left wondering who exactly, if anyone, was defamed, insulted, or offended in any manner by those words."
He queried further: "Crucially, what precisely was the improper conduct for which the applicant was convicted?"
He stated that after examining the testimonies of all witnesses before the Disciplinary Board, none explained how those words constituted misconduct.
According to the Judge, the applicant was never informed with the required legal certainty regarding what misconduct he was accused of committing.
"Disciplinary proceedings cannot conclude with dismissal over misconduct whose legal and factual elements are not clearly defined. Discipline, however necessary, must align with strict adherence to the law," he emphasised.
He added that when disciplinary authorities charge someone using a non-existent provision or particulars lacking a defined offence, they act ultra vires.
"Consequently, the decision exceeds jurisdiction, suffers a fatal legal defect, and is voidable. Public bodies possess no inherent powers; they derive authority from the Constitution and statutes."
The Judge further noted that he understood the applicant appealed against his dismissal, but held that the step was legally unnecessary.
"In law, a decision stemming from a non-existent offence equals no decision at all. I firmly hold that an appellate authority cannot validate or confer legal effect upon a decision based on an unspecified or non-existent offence."
For those reasons, the Judge quashed the dismissal decision alongside the appellate decision upholding the punishment, ordering his immediate reinstatement.
"An order is hereby issued directing the second respondent (IGP) to reinstate the applicant into the Police Force immediately, without prejudice to his rights."
Additionally, he ordered that the applicant be paid all withheld salaries, allowances, and entitlements from the dismissal date until reinstatement as stipulated by the law.
