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Examining Russia’s justification for invading Ukraine

Ukraine pic

Ukrainian troops take up a position as they battle Russian units in 2023. PHOTO | FILE

What you need to know:

When Russia invaded Ukraine, Putin presented three primary justifications: Nato expansion, “denazification” and demilitarisation

When the Berlin Wall fell, Vladimir Putin was a mid-ranking KGB officer stationed in Dresden. As protests swelled outside the Stasi office, he tried desperately to maintain order, only to be met with silence from Moscow. The Soviet Union, the state he had dedicated his life to, was also collapsing.

This dramatic collapse left an indelible scar on his psyche—a trauma that continues to inform his decisions today. He labelled the collapse “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”. His nostalgia for a restored Russia, his admiration for the legacy of Peter the Great and the Russian Empire, and even his reverence for the iron-fisted Joseph Stalin, all offer crucial insights into his worldview.

When Russia invaded Ukraine, Putin presented three primary justifications: Nato expansion, “denazification”, and demilitarisation. Examining these reasons is essential to understanding what he wanted to achieve in Ukraine.

For Putin and Russia, Nato’s eastward expansion is far more than a mere defensive move—it is seen as an existential provocation. Over the past three decades, as Nato has incorporated numerous Eastern European countries, Moscow has perceived this as a strategy by the West to encircle and contain Russia. Putin has contended that Nato’s true purpose is not to uphold democracy but to restrict Russian influence, thereby forcing Russia into a corner.

The second justification advanced by Putin is the need for “denazification” of Ukraine. According to Putin, Ukraine harbours dangerous Nazi elements intent on oppressing Russian-speaking citizens. This claim draws on historical episodes in which some Ukrainian nationalist groups collaborated with Nazi Germany during WW2.

The third justification is demilitarisation. Putin argues that Ukraine, increasingly strengthened by Western modern weaponry, poses an unacceptable threat to Russia. According to this line of reasoning, a militarised Ukraine—aligned with the hostile West—could destabilise the fragile balance of power and eventually serve as a launchpad for aggression against Russia.

Let’s critically examine each of these points.

First, the Nato expansion argument, while presenting a legitimate security concern, is contentious. On one side, after the Cold War, the West clearly mishandled its engagement with Russia. Economist Jeffrey Sachs, who advised both Poland and Russia on economic restructuring, noted how the West generously funded Poland’s transition but left Russia to fend for itself, exacerbating economic turmoil and resentment. A brief window existed to turn Russia from a foe into a friend, but the West wanted Russia’s total capitulation. That hasn’t worked out well, has it?

On the other side, Russia’s actions also shaped the West’s and Nato’s trajectory. Moscow’s military interventions in Lithuania and Chechnya, and support for separatists in Moldova signalled to its neighbours that they needed Western security guarantees if they were to maintain independence from Moscow.

Critically, Nato had not expanded for a decade when Putin invaded Crimea in 2014. Until then, Ukraine had a neutrality clause in its constitution, barring it from Nato membership. It was only after a deal with Putin pushed President Viktor Yanukovych to renege on an EU association agreement—sparking the Maidan protests—that Ukraine pivoted westward. Russia’s response was swift: the annexation of Crimea and the orchestration of separatist conflicts in Donetsk and Luhansk.

If preventing further Nato expansion was the goal, why start this war when Ukraine was ineligible for membership due to its territorial disputes? The strategy has proved sufficient to keep Georgia and Moldova in check, why not Ukraine?

Second, the narrative that Ukraine is riddled with Nazis intent on exterminating Russian speakers is wrought with propaganda. While Ukraine does have extremist nationalist groups, branding the entire country as a Nazi state is misleading. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who is both Jewish and a native Russian speaker, hardly fits the profile of a fascist leader. Furthermore, collaboration with the Nazis was not unique to Ukraine – it happened in every occupied nation. Ironically, 25 percent of Soviet soldiers and 40 percent of Soviet casualties in WW2 were Ukrainian. The so-called Ukrainian ‘Nazis’ were nationalists resisting Soviet domination then and Russian domination now.

Finally, while it is true that military buildup near Russia’s borders can heighten tensions, the claim that Ukraine’s armed forces represented a threat is an exaggeration. We have a clear example right now – the West has been arming Ukraine since the beginning of the war, but has that made Ukraine a threat to Russia? At the beginning of the war, Russia was outgunning Ukraine by over 10 to 1 – so, in which world was Ukraine going to be a threat to Russia? The West’s support for Ukraine was meant to preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty after Russia’s manoeuvres in the east.

It is clear that Russia’s justifications for war reveal that this war was not a strategic necessity. The stated Russian objectives, that is, not joining Nato, “denazification”, and demilitarisation sound like a code word for stripping Ukraine of its sovereignty and control of its future.

So, apart from these pretexts, we still have to explain Putin’s real intentions for this war. In the coming article, we will explore the deeper motivations behind Russia’s most consequential decision of the 21st century.

Charles Makakala is a Technology and Management Consultant based in Dar es Salaam